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There is great interest in the evolution of economic behavior. In
typical studies, species are asked to play one of a series of economic
games, derived from game theory, and their responses are com-
pared. The advantage of this approach is the relative level of con-
sistency and control that emerges from the games themselves;
however, in the typical experiment, procedures and conditions dif-
ferwidely, particularly between humans and other species. Thus, in
the current study, we investigated how three primate species,
capuchin monkeys, chimpanzees, and humans, played the Assur-
ance (or StagHunt) gameusing procedures thatwere, to the best of
our ability, the same across species, particularly with respect to
training and pretesting. Our goal was to determine what, if any,
differences existed in the ways in which these species made
decisions in this game. We hypothesized differences along phylo-
genetic lines, which we found. However, the species were more
similar than might be expected. In particular, humans who played
using “nonhuman primate-friendly” rules did not behave as is typ-
ical. Thus, we ﬁnd evidence for similarity in decision-making pro-
cesses across the order Primates. These results indicate that such
comparative studies are possible and, moreover, that in any com-
parison rating species’ relative abilities, extreme care must be
taken in ensuring that one species does not have an advantage
over the others due to methodological procedures.
cooperation | coordination | comparative behavior | evolution of behavior
Recent advances in the study of economic decision makinghave fundamentally altered how we view the science of eco-
nomics. Beginning with experimental economics (1) and conti-
nuing in more recently emerging ﬁelds such as neuroeconomics
(2, 3), there has been a much more scientiﬁc approach to under-
standing how humans make decisions in economic contexts. Most
recently, there has emerged an interest in understanding the
evolution of human decision making, primarily as studied using a
comparative approach. Although studies of rats and pigeons
emergedmany decades ago, a recent surge with additional species
has provided even more data relevant to social scientists in-
terested in decision making.
Although game theory has been used independently in behav-
ioral ecology for decades (4), it is only recently that human eco-
nomic games have been used extensively to address decision-
making behavior (5, 6) and underlying neural activity (7). There
are certainly reasons to think that humans and other primates
might be similar in their decision-making abilities. Other primates
are our closest living relatives—we share a common ancestor with
chimpanzees within approximately the last 6 million y (8)—so
there is a high likelihood of homology. Even though this does not
mean identical decision making, it implies similarity in the un-
derlying structures. Nonhuman primates also show many of the
same cognitive skills, and even biases (9, 10), as humans. Alter-
nately, though, humans are distinct from other primates, and even
a few million years is sufﬁcient for substantial evolutionary
divergence. In fact, despite the use of nonhuman primate models
as a means of understanding human cognitive evolution, some
studies have indicated differences between us (6, 11), and there
remains a sense that humans are the exceptional primate (12, 13).
An often overlooked aspect of this debate, however, is incon-
sistent methodology. At the most basic level, procedural differ-
ences, such as in timing, reward, and experimental environment,
may make a difference in outcomes and imply species differences
that do not necessarily exist (14). More critically, there are typi-
cally fundamental differences in procedure and format that
advantage humans. Humans can be verbally instructed on con-
straints, rules, and contingencies; presented with payoff matri-
ces; and given pretests to verify understanding. Animals cannot.
Instead, they must be trained, and investigators must infer when
individuals across species possess an apparently equivalent un-
derstanding of the task. Given the differences in procedure,
however, this cannot be assumed any more than can evolu-
tionary homology. Thus, the purpose of our study was to provide
a comparison that was as procedurally similar as possible across
three species frequently used in studies of cooperation. Our goal
was to create as fair a playing ﬁeld for this cross-species as-
sessment as possible and to see whether previously reported
differences remained.
Different disciplines deﬁne cooperation differently, so it is im-
portant to clarify what we mean in this case. We deﬁne cooper-
ation as a situation in which two individuals can increase their
immediate payoffs by working together. This deﬁnition empha-
sizes the behaviors of the individuals involved, as measured by
their decisions and the pair’s outcomes. Thus, our focus is on what
the individual gains from the behavior (i.e., the proximate payoff
to their decision making), rather than whether the individual un-
derstands their behavior (i.e., the cognitive or neural mechanisms
underlying their decision). This evolutionary perspective differs
from both psychology and economics, which tend to have a more
mechanistic focus. However, it allows for a direct comparison
without assuming cognitive complexity that may not be required
(15), or reliance on self-report, which may be unreliable (16).
Of course, testing multiple species with additional paradigms
is not sufﬁcient; it is also critical that all species have some ability
in the chosen task. Otherwise, apparent differences in ability may
instead be due to differences in aptitude to the speciﬁc task.
Even among closely related species, differences in ecology may
lead to selection for quite different skills (17). We tested ca-
puchin monkeys, chimpanzees, and humans, three species that
show a strong tendency to cooperate across multiple domains
and have demonstrated an ability to extrapolate these skills to
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experimental tasks in the laboratory (18–20; see SI Methods for
additional detail).
We used the Assurance game, in which each individual must
choose whether to coordinate for a large reward that they only
receive if their partner also takes the same action. We chose this
game because it is simple in that there are two symmetric
strategies that result in two Nash equilibria, one risk-dominant
and the other payoff-dominant. The strategy in the risk-domi-
nant equilibrium generates a sure payoff regardless of what the
partner does. The strategy in the payoff-dominant equilibrium, if
both partners play it, generates a payoff that strictly dominates
the risk-dominant payoff. In other words, in the payoff-dominant
strategy, both individuals’ objectives are aligned.
The goal of this study was to provide a multispecies compar-
ison of an interdependent game when the task was presented
using nearly identical methodology in a nearly identical experi-
mental environment to all species. We designed the procedure to
be particularly amenable to nonhuman primates, but also of
sufﬁcient interest to allow for human use. Note that by designing
the study ﬁrst for nonhuman primates and then adapting it for
humans, we reversed the typical procedure. We paid careful
attention to the details, including potentially “irrelevant” fea-
tures, such as the mechanism by which payoffs were delivered
and the previous experience of the participants. This made the
tasks as similar as possible, given the obvious differences among
the species in terms of their housing and lifestyles. We hypoth-
esized that we would ﬁnd differences in game play, with humans
outperforming the other two species, based on humans’ more
developed cognitive abilities and increased cooperative tenden-
cies. We did not have a directional prediction for the two non-
human primates; chimpanzees are more closely related to
humans (8), but capuchin monkeys have a similar brain-to-body
ratio (21) and are known to be highly cooperative (see details
above). We also predicted that the differences we found might
be minimized in comparison with other studies due to the more
similar procedures used in the current experiment.
Methods
Assurance Game. The game we used was a common game of coordination
called the Assurance game, sometimes referred to as the Stag Hunt game. This
is a generic 2 × 2 game with the following constraints on the payoffs:w > x ≥
z > y (Table S1). This game has two pure-strategy Nash equilibria: (Stag-Stag),
which is the payoff-dominant equilibrium (e.g., that which maximizes payoff
to both individuals), and (Hare-Hare), which is the risk-dominant equilibrium
if x > z (e.g., that which minimizes risk to both individuals). This well-known
coordination game is interesting to economists because strategic uncertainty
plays a key role in the selection of the equilibrium, yet the players’ objectives
are aligned (see ref. 22 for a summary). In the Assurance game, the objec-
tives may be the same (Stag, Stag), but the question of strategic interest is
how sure a given player is that the other player will play Stagwhen he or she
plays Stag. Evidence from coordination game experiments indicate that the
payoff-dominant equilibrium is not a focal point with repeated interactions
(as in ref. 23) or with anonymous play with different individuals (as in ref.
24). We note, however, that the former experiment involves more than two
players with more than two potential actions, and the latter experiment uses
a 3 × 3 coordination experiment.
General Method. We redesigned the typical, normal-form Assurance game
methodology speciﬁcally to work across species. Decisions were made by
returning one of two tokens to an experimenter, one of which represented
the Stag strategy and one of which represented the Hare strategy. (We use
the word “strategy” to conform to the standard lexicon of game theory,
which indicates a choice or decision but makes no assumptions about the
underlying cognitive processes or understanding which led to that decision.)
For the procedure, each subject was given one of each token. Experimenters
then solicited a token from the subject (see below for details for each spe-
cies). When each participant had returned a single token of their choice,
they were held up so that both subjects could see which tokens were
returned by each individual. Then each subject received (or not) a reward
dependent upon both what they returned and what their partner returned,
following the payoff structure of the Assurance experiment (payoffs were
standardized throughout the following experiments). If the subject returned
both tokens, they were presented again without comment and solicitation
continued until a single token was returned. For rewards, nonhuman pri-
mates received small pieces of preferred food rewards (fruit) and humans
received money (quarters/dollar bills). The reward structure was such that
mutual Stag play was the most beneﬁcial (4 units), mutual Hare resulted in
a low payoff (1 unit each), and the uncoordinated payoff of playing Stag
when one’s partner plays Hare was unrewarded (however, the partner that
played Hare still received 1 unit).
Unique Components of Experimental Design and Procedures. The procedures
explicitly incorporated a number of differences from the traditional normal-
form game to allow for direct comparison across species. First, no subject
received any verbal instruction. The humans’ only instruction was limited to
the following six points:
i) Have you participated in an economic experiment before? (Both must
answer “yes” to participate. This was to verify that they had previous
experience in this laboratory making decisions that led to rewar-
ded outcomes.)
ii) In this experiment you will be using red and blue chips to make deci-
sions behind a partition.
iii) As the experiment progresses you may be paid in quarters.
iv) Please collect the coins in the yellow cups provided.
v) These are the only instructions you will receive in the experiment. Once
the experiment begins, the experimenter will not be allowed to answer
any questions until the experiment is over.
vi) Do you have any questions before the experiment begins?
Second, no species received any pretests designed to assess task un-
derstanding. Thus, all subjects, including humans, had to discover the payoff
structure during the course of the game. However, because there were only
twooptions, therewere only four possible outcomes and the parameter space
was limited and easy to explore. All species easily perform similar kinds of tasks
with varied response strategies that must be retained in memory (e.g.,
conditional discrimination tasks).
Third, all subjects, including humans, were paid in the actual currency
(food or cash) on each trial, rather than rewards accumulating and being
awarded at the end. This is a common procedure for nonhuman primates, and
it is possible that the immediacy of obtaining the reward, rather than seeing
a number accumulate, alters responses. Althoughwe cannot verify that these
rewards have equivalent subjective value for each species or, indeed, for each
individual within a species, we chose rewards that are highly valued in such
testing situations. Humans’ decisions ranged from $0 to $1 for each round, so
each decision was valuable and they had the opportunity for a large payoff
($40 + $7 show-up payment for 10–15 min of participation, or $0.50–$2 per
min). In addition, the use of qualitatively different rewards does not sub-
stantively impact humans’ or nonhumans’ choice behavior (25).
Finally, all subjects sat immediately next to their partner, again common in
nonhuman primate, but not human, studies. This had two direct impacts on
the study. First, subjects were not anonymous, and it was clear that they were
playing together without having been told this. The lack of anonymity
enhances the likelihood of achieving the Pareto-dominant outcome. Second,
subjects had the capability to communicate with each other to whatever
degree they were able, given their species. This might include direct com-
munication, including vocalizations, gestures, and, in humans, speaking (only
2 pairs of 26 human pairs spoke), or indirect communication, including un-
consciously communicating their intentions through body posture, facial
expression, or gesture, behaviors that humans are known to use (26, 27).
Nonhuman primates. All nonhuman primates were socially housed in multi-
male, multifemale social arrangements with extensive indoor and outdoor
living space complete with environmental enrichment. For details on species’
housing, see SI Methods. Nonhuman primates received 30 trials per session,
excepting the chimpanzees from the Language Research Center of Georgia
State University (LRC), which tended to lose interest and so received 20 trials
per session. All test sessions were videotaped for later analysis.
Although in a typical Assurance game, choices aremade simultaneously (or
functionally simultaneously), we were unable to separate some individuals in
such a way that they could see each other and not the tokens. Thus, we
initially tested all nonhuman primates without a visual barrier, and hid the
tokens as they were returned. Nonetheless, subjects may have been able to
view what the other subject was doing while, or before, making their own
choice, meaning that they might have been playing an extensive-form game
(see below for details). Our plan was to then incorporate a divider and see
whether the animals’ behavior remained the same. However, given the
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results, this option was pursued in only one group of chimpanzees (see
below for details).
Capuchin monkeys. Capuchin monkeys lived at the LRC in two multimale,
multifemale social groups of ﬁve to eight individuals with offspring present
(subjects included two male and two female subjects from one group and
three male and one female from the other).
Chimpanzees, MD Anderson Cancer Center. Subjects included 20 chim-
panzees housed in social groups at the Michale E. Keeling Center for Com-
parative Medicine and Research of the University of Texas MD Anderson
Cancer Center (MDA). There were two changes to the protocol from the
capuchins. First, the chimpanzees could not be separated, so to keep them
from stealing each other’s tokens, we used T-shaped PVC pipes that could be
placed through the mesh of the caging but were held in place by the top of
the T. Second, we used two experimenters, one for each ape, as it was dif-
ﬁcult for one experimenter to interact with both subjects simultaneously.
The experimenters simultaneously provided each chimpanzee with one of
each token and, after both subjects had returned their tokens, the experi-
menters simultaneously held them both up and proceeded to give the ap-
propriate rewards. Neither experimenter was aware of what token the other
chimpanzee returned to the other experimenter, and therefore the poten-
tial for cuing a given response was minimized.
Chimpanzees, Language Research Center. We tested four additional
chimpanzees (two male, two female) that lived at the LRC. The experimental
procedure at the LRC was identical to that at MDA, except that the chim-
panzees were separated into different cages for testing. There was additional
testing for twopairs that chose the payoff-dominant outcome (Stag-Stag). For
theﬁrst test, we added a partition to block their view of the other’s choice (all
other procedures were identical). This partition extended only up to the
chimpanzees’ shoulder height, so that they could identify each other, and
extended ∼18 inches in front of the caging, to eliminate the possibility that
they saw what the experimenter accepted. Because the T-shaped tokens
could not bemoved in such away that their partner could see them, the game
was functionally simultaneous. The second test was identical to the barrier
procedure but used two new tokens, a purple token (Stag) and a green token
(Hare), to see whether they could extrapolate their behavior to novel tokens
used in the same game. This allowed us to verify that any consistencies in
behavior between the original and barrier tests were due to active choices
rather than established preferences for one or the other token.
Humans. Fifty-two undergraduate subjects were recruited from the general
student body at Chapman University. Subjects were randomly recruited via an
e-mail system and paid $7 for showing up on time, plus what they earned in
the experiment. Each subject had participated in at least one economic ex-
periment before this session so that they had experience with receiving
actual payment for their decisions in this laboratory. This was necessary for
a direct comparison, as all nonhuman primates had previous experience
making decisions during experiments to receive food rewards. Accumulated
coins and dollar bills were converted into large bills at the conclusion of the
experiment. No subject participated in more than one pairing.
Upon hearing the limited instructions listed above, the humans were
seated in desk chairs next to one another in front of a 4-ft circular table. On
the table was a T-shaped partition that horizontally separated the experi-
menter from the subjects and prevented direct eye contact. The partition also
vertically split the table into two halves, one for each subject. The partition
separating the subjects did not extend to the edge of the table (it stopped ∼4
in from the edge) so that they could comfortably make eye contact with
each other (as could the nonhuman primates). Subjects could have leaned
around to watch each other submit their token, but video analysis revealed
that none did so.
The barrier separating the subjects from the experimenter had a 2 in × 5.5
in slot at the bottom of each side through which the experimenter slid the
two tokens (one red and one blue poker chip) at the beginning of each trial.
The experimenter also passed their earnings through this slot at the end of
each trial. At the top, the partition also included a 1 in × 5 in slot for each
subject, outlined in green, through which they could submit tokens. The
experimenter held a ceramic bowl under each slot to collect the tokens,
which allowed the subjects to hear whether their counterpart had made
a decision. After receiving a single token from each subject, the experi-
menter held up the tokens above the barrier, with each token in front of the
subject who submitted it. He then put down the tokens, held up the ap-
propriate payoff (quarter or dollar bill), or raised an open hand on that side
if there was nothing, and then slid the token and payoff to the respective
subject through the bottom slot of the barrier. If a subject slid two tokens
through the green slot, the experimenter returned them both through the
bottom slot (with no comment from the experimenter) until the subject
returned a single token. If a subject slid money through the slot, it was
immediately returned to the subject through the bottom slot. During no
session did a subject try to talk to the experimenter. Due to the constraints
of subject recruitment, humans received only a single session, so they were
given 40 trials.
Statistics. Pairs’ outcomes were compared with chance using χ2 tests, in-
cluding the Yates continuity correction for observations less than 40 (28). In
cases in which there were fewer than ﬁve occurrences within a cell, the
Fisher test was used instead, and when there were no occurrences in mul-
tiple cells, proportions were reported in lieu of statistics. In all cases, the unit
of analysis was the pair. Note that these statistics are intended to determine
whether that pair’s behavior differed from chance, not whether these
results generalize to the species as a whole.
In addition to comparing overall outcomes, we examined changes in
individuals’ behavior that may have indicated a nonrandom strategy in
making decisions (28). To do this, we ﬁrst examined individuals’ choices us-
ing the binomial (proportions) test, to see whether there was an overall
preference for either Stag or Hare choices. Second, we used the non-
parametric runs test, which determines whether the distribution of a series
of binary events is random. A run is deﬁned as a sequence within a series in
which one of the two alternatives occurs on consecutive trials. The null hy-
pothesis is that the series is generated randomly, that is, there are neither
too few nor too many runs. Finally, we used the nonparametric change-
point test to determine whether there was a change in the binomial process
that generates a series of binary events. Note that the test does not assume
a priori when a change occurred. The null hypothesis is that there is no
change at any point in the sequence. All statistics were two-tailed and sig-
niﬁcance was at the P < 0.05 level.
Results
Capuchin Monkeys.Among the six capuchin pairs, only one (16%)
chose Stag-Stag more often than by chance (χ2 = 4.57, df = 1,
P < 0.05) (Table 1). We also considered the possibility that the
capuchins would perform better given extended opportunities to
participate (although ﬁve of the eight individuals participated in
more than one pair). Thus, we ran two pairs for additional ses-
sions. After a total of 32 sessions, one of these pairs matched
each other’s choice but showed no preference for Stag-Stag or
Hare-Hare (last 10 sessions: χ2 = 5.38, df = 1, P < 0.05).
Individual capuchins made nonrandom choices. One monkey
preferred to return the Stag token (binomial test, P = 0.024), ﬁve
showed more or fewer runs than anticipated (all P ≤ 0.002), and
two changed their decision-making strategy during game play
(change-point test, P < 0.05). Among individuals tested in mul-
tiple pairings, some changed their behavior between partners.
Two monkeys showed nonrandom behavior (as measured by the
runs test) with one partner but not the other.
Chimpanzees. MD Anderson. Eight of the 10 pairs’ choices deviated
from chance. Six pairs “matched,” with both partners choosing the
Table 1. Frequencies of different strategies across species
No strategy Matching
Risk-
dominant
Payoff-
dominant
Capuchin (6) 5 (4) 0 (1) 0 (0) 1 (1)
MDA chimp (10) 2 (4) 8 (6) 0 (0) 0 (0)
LRC chimp (4) 2 (1) 0 (0) 0 (0) 2 (3)
LRC barrier (2) 1 0 0 1
LRC novel (2) 0 0 0 2
Human (26) 8* 3 10 5
Numbers in parentheses beside species indicate the number of pairs
tested. LRC chimpanzees participated in three conditions (see Methods for
details). Some nonhuman primates participated in greater than 10 sessions.
For an equal comparison, results are reported from only the ﬁrst 10 sessions
ﬁrst, and results considering all sessions tested are indicated in parentheses.
Matching for the MDA chimps includes two pairs that matched against their
partner’s play.
*This includes two pairs who played the payoff-dominant strategy on 29
trials of 40. These two pairs are not included in the payoff-dominant column.
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same token (all χ2 > 27.69, df = 1, all P < 0.001). However, none
of these pairs preferentially chose either the Stag-Stag or theHare-
Hare options, despite extensive experience with both payoffs. Both
of the remaining pairs were more likely to choose the option
opposite to what their partner chose (e.g., Stag-Hare orHare-Stag:
χ2 = 6.25, df = 1, P < 0.05; χ2 = 183.05, df = 1, P < 0.001).
The above analyses were done using the entire dataset of 20
sessions. To more directly compare the chimpanzees with the
capuchin monkeys, we repeated the analysis using only the ﬁrst
10 sessions each pair completed (partners did not switch). Five of
the six pairs that matched across 20 sessions were doing so al-
ready in the ﬁrst 10 sessions (all χ2 > 4.39, df = 1, P < 0.05). Of
the two subjects that chose oppositely from their partner, one
did so in the ﬁrst 10 sessions (χ2 = 17.25, df = 1, P < 0.001).
Remaining analyses were done on all 20 sessions to include as
much data as possible.
The matching outcomes seen in six pairs could emerge in two
contexts. First, one partner may have “understood” the task and
matched (or not) their partner’s choice. Second, both individuals
may have understood the need to match, but failed to recognize
that one outcome provided higher payoffs than the other. Thus,
we investigated the frequency with which one individual spon-
taneously made the ﬁrst choice among all 10 pairs (we decided
to record these data after commencing the study, so we have data
on all 20 sessions for 6 pairs and the last 15, 14, 11, and 10
sessions, respectively, for the remaining pairs). In 6 of the 10
pairs, one individual was more likely to make the ﬁrst move than
the other (binomial tests, all P ≤ 0.003). In four of these cases,
the pair matched and in one case the pair played oppositely.
Looking at it another way, among the pairs that matched, in four
of them (66.7%) one subject typically went ﬁrst. Among the pairs
that chose oppositely, in one of them (50%) one subject typically
went ﬁrst. Finally, among the two pairs that showed no consistent
response, in one pair (50%) one of them typically went ﬁrst.
Thus, there is no evidence that a spontaneous consistent order to
sequential play affected outcomes.
Only 4 subjects of the 20 showed a preference for one token
over the other (binomial test, all P < 0.05). These four apes either
matched (n= 3) or played oppositely (n= 1) to their partner. All
20 chimpanzees showed more runs than anticipated (runs test, all
P < 0.001). Five of the 20 chimpanzees switched strategies more
than 500 times in 600 trials, possibly indicating a side bias. No
chimpanzee changed their decision-making strategy during the
game (change-point test, all subjects nonsigniﬁcant).
Language Research Center. Four pairs of subjects were initially
tested. Of these, two pairs preferentially chose the Stag-Stag
option (χ2 = 23.79, df = 1, P < 0.001; 97% preference for Stag-
Stag, no statistic calculated due to empty cells). Of the
remaining two pairs, one failed to settle on a strategy (χ2 = 0.16,
df = 1, P > 0.05). The other preferred Stag (χ2 = 24.61, df = 1,
P < 0.001), but due to the female choosing Stag predominantly
while the male chose randomly. Thus, we performed additional
testing only on the two pairs that showed a robust preference for
the Stag-Stag option.
To test whether the subjects understood the game or were
visually matching their partners, we erected a barrier between
the individuals so that they could not see their partner’s choice
(Methods). One pair continued choosing the payoff-dominant
outcome (99% preference for Stag-Stag), whereas the other did
not (χ2 = 0.05, df = 1, P > 0.05), although the male in the latter
pair chose Stag more than Hare (binomial test, P < 0.001).
However, when novel tokens were introduced, both pairs were
more likely to play Stag-Stag than any other option (χ2 = 78.2,
df = 1, P < 0.001; χ2 = 62.6, df = 1, P < 0.05), although again in
the latter pair this appeared to emerge primarily because of the
male’s preference for Stag (P < 0.001).
Considering their individual behavior, in the pair that always
chose the payoff-dominant outcome, both chimpanzees preferred
Stag (binomial test, both P < 0.001) and showed fewer runs than
anticipated, likely because of their preference for Stag. However,
both showed more runs than anticipated on the novel token test
(P = 0.002) and one did so on the barrier test (P = 0.002),
possibly because they were new situations. Both also showed
a change in strategy in the novel token test (both P < 0.05), the
test for which they initially showed the most Hare choices.
Because these four chimpanzees played in multiple pairings,
we were also able to investigate whether their behavior changed
with different individuals. Only one chimpanzee, the one that
showed the least evidence for nonrandom behavior, did not alter
his behavior. The two individuals that showed the most evidence
of understanding changed strategy in all conditions with their
other partners but only in the novel token condition with each
other. The remaining female showed a change in behavior with
one partner but not the other.
Humans. Among human subjects, 5 of the 26 pairs matched Stag-
Stag on 75% or more of the trials (e.g., ≥30 of the 40 trials; an
additional 2 pairs matched on 29 of 40 trials). Ten matched
Hare-Hare, and 3 matched their partner, with an equal number of
Stag-Stag and Hare-Hare choices. Intriguingly, 8 of the 26 pairs
(31%) never matched Stag-Stag a single time, and all of these
pairs preferentially matched Hare-Hare. Only one pair never
matched Hare-Hare. Thus, humans who found Hare-Hare were
less likely to explore alternate possibilities.
Of the 52 participants, all but 7 showed signiﬁcant preferences
for one token over the other over the course of the 20 trials
(binomial test, all P < 0.05). Twenty participants more often
chose the Hare option, whereas 25 more often chose Stag. For
the seven participants who showed no preference, four partic-
ipants showed more or fewer runs than anticipated (P < 0.05;
two additional subjects showed a nonsigniﬁcant trend in this
direction, P ≤ 0.10). Twenty subjects showed no change in the
decision-making process (change-point test, P > 0.05). Fourteen
of these preferred the Stag option throughout (thus 56% of those
who preferred Stag did so from the beginning), whereas three
chose Hare throughout. In the ﬁnal three cases, the subjects
never settled on a strategy. Thus, the majority of subjects (49 of
52) showed nonrandom behavior.
Discussion
We found that although there were differences in the degree to
which each species could achieve payoff-dominant outcomes,
there was continuity in behavior across species. Speciﬁcally, there
was a phylogenetic ordering with respect to the primates’ decision
outcomes, with more efﬁcient, payoff-dominant outcomes ach-
ieved more frequently in human pairs than in those of other
primate species, and with chimpanzees doing so more frequently
than capuchins. However, when procedures were equalized, only
a subset of humans achieved these efﬁcient outcomes, and pairs of
both other species did so as well. Thus, when tested in similar
conditions, other primates reached similar behavioral outcomes
to humans more often than might have been expected based on
the typical normal-form economic experiment. Consequently, we
found support for both of our predictions, and potentially evi-
dence of evolutionary continuity in decision making.
Considering this in more detail, the capuchin monkeys, which
are phylogenetically most distant from humans, showed the least
structured behavior. Only one pair chose Stag-Stag more often
than chance, and only ﬁve of the eight subjects demonstrated
behavior that indicated nonrandom choice behavior. Note, too,
that despite statistical signiﬁcance, the pair that achieved the
payoff-dominant outcome did so less frequently than the chim-
panzees and humans who found the same outcome. Chimpan-
zees were intermediate, and the most frequent strategy was
unanticipated. Although only two pairs of chimpanzees consis-
tently reached the payoff-dominant outcome (see below for
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more details), the majority matched their partner. This strategy
led to rewards for each individual on each trial, yet Hare-Hare
was not as efﬁcient as Stag-Stag. It is not clear why they did not
alter their behavior. However, the fact that the dominant strategy
seemed positional (they showed a side bias in their choices,
a common behavior in primates) may indicate that despite
ﬁnding a solution, they did not attend to the interaction in the
same way as did the humans. Finally, despite being the species
for which the highest frequency of pairs achieved the payoff-
dominant outcome, even among humans fewer than 20% of pairs
did so (this increases to 27% if two borderline pairs are in-
cluded). An additional 38% of pairs achieved the risk-dominant
outcome (Hare-Hare), and 12% matched their partner. It is
worth reiterating that despite humans’ success compared with
the other primates, a nontrivial proportion of the pairs failed to
achieve the payoff-dominant outcome. This underscores the
difﬁculty of ﬁnding outcomes when the typical human proce-
dures (instructions, payoff matrices, pretests for understanding)
are absent, common handicaps for nonhuman species. None-
theless, even when the ﬁeld is leveled, humans are more likely
than other primates to achieve these most efﬁcient outcomes.
With respect to the chimpanzees, it is interesting, although not
diagnostic with only a single pair, that the pairs that achieved
the most efﬁcient outcome even in a functionally simultaneous
design (e.g., the barrier condition) with novel tokens had a sub-
stantially different rearing history. They were cognitively en-
riched from infancy and are accustomed to these kinds of
interactive tasks. The one that subjectively seemed to understand
it ﬁrst had previous experience exchanging with a partner to
obtain tools (29), and this particular pair was the most successful
in a recent barter task requiring them to exchange tokens with
each other (30). It may be that previous experiences had led this
pair to expect that interaction with the partner and the experi-
menter could provide rewards. These chimpanzees also may be
more like humans in how they perceive these kinds of tasks, for
instance understanding it as an opportunity for rewards in a way
the others do not, or perhaps even enhancing their interest in the
task. Thus, some chimpanzees can achieve maximizing outcomes
in economic games that are equivalent to those of humans, yet
they may require specialized background experience to do so (31).
Such variation also reinforces the need, whenever possible, to test
a large number of primates with varied backgrounds (e.g., mul-
tifacility collaborations) to fully unearth the extent of their abili-
ties and the extent of intraspeciﬁc variation within each species.
Although in most cases subjects played only with one other
individual, in several cases with chimpanzees and capuchin
monkeys we were able to re-pair individuals with more than one
partner. Interestingly, in some of these cases, we found differ-
ences in behavior among different partners. Among capuchins,
two of the three individuals tested with multiple partners
behaved differently with different partners, and three of the four
LRC chimpanzees did the same. These data do not allow us to
determine which feature was important in changing the primates’
behavior (e.g., relationships, the different distribution of choices
among different partners), but the fact that they were present
indicates sensitivity to the changing conditions created by playing
with a new partner. Although similar data are not available for
humans, we anticipate that this would also be the case with them.
What leads to the underlying similarity in decision outcomes
between humans and other species? A ﬁrst hypothesis is that
there is similarity in the underlying decision-making architecture
across the primates. This would indicate that, whereas humans
may possess additional traits that allow more complex problems
to be solved, such as narrative language, these additions support,
but do not fundamentally alter, our basic primate decision
structures. In fact, although all three species have large brain-to-
body ratios and cooperate extensively in both natural and labo-
ratory conditions, the species’ ecologies are consistent with our
results. Humans live in an environment with ample opportunities
to coordinate, particularly among out-group members, which
might have led to selection on enhanced tendencies to do so
beyond that seen in other species. Chimpanzees also coordinate
to a greater degree than capuchins, for instance taking comple-
mentary roles in group hunts (32). These ecological differences
may have increased selection pressure differentially across spe-
cies, leading to differences in degree, if not kind, in decision
making. The similarity of the cognitively enriched chimpanzees,
whose rearing history and behavior were both similar to humans’,
supports the contention that underlying processes may be simi-
lar, and are affected by early experience.
However, there are alternative explanations. In particular, this
hypothesis fails to explain humans’ unexpectedly low level of
success in the current game. This is difﬁcult to explain by moti-
vation, as rewards were quite high (approximately $0.50–$2 per
min). In interpreting our results, we note that our procedures
differed nontrivially from the traditional study of strategic be-
havior of humans in the laboratory. Providing common in-
formation on all of the payoff contingencies is simply not feasible
for nonhuman primates, but the human cognitive ability to in-
ternalize the interdependency of the payoffs may be key for
distinguishing human performance in this game from nonhuman
primate performance. Future research is needed to compare
results from the “primate format” with those that more closely
follow traditional normal-form game format.
Having considered the similarities, it is interesting to speculate
on the differences in behavior among the three primates. Al-
though we equalized many aspects of the experimental design,
we were not able to do so for all factors. One of these may have
inﬂuenced results. We were able to test all individuals, including
humans, in a setting in which only that pair and the experimenter
were present. Moreover, all had previous experience in the
laboratory in which they were tested, all rewards were paid out in
the actual currency (cash or fruit) by the experimenter on a trial-
by-trial basis, no pairings were anonymous, and all subjects of all
species lived day-to-day in multimale, multifemale social groups.
Nonetheless, only humans were tested with strangers (unfamiliar
primates do not peacefully interact) and humans used a partition
that blocked their view of their partner’s choice. Although we do
not know whether the primates made use of their ability to see
their partner’s rewards, they may have done so (excepting the
LRC chimpanzees tested with the barrier). Finally, contrary to
most such comparisons, this game was designed for nonhumans
and adapted to humans, which may have made the task unusual
for humans. All of these differences should have made the task
more difﬁcult for humans, if anything minimizing the difference
between humans and other primates.
Differences in behavior may reﬂect less about strategic decision
making and more about how each species comes to understand
the nature of the task. Although humans faced challenges in this
particular task, nonhuman primates, too, may need different
procedures or additional time and experience to come to un-
derstand the contingencies of the task. Thus, as with the humans,
their responses may say more about their ability to understand the
experimental procedure (or the underlying structure of the task)
than whether they can coordinate responses to maximize reward.
Also, species may reach the same functional outcome using dif-
ferent mechanisms. For instance, the simplest explanation for
matching behavior when partners can see each other’s responses
is visual matching, which would functionally result in successful
coordination and, hence, rewardmaximization. However, humans
and some chimpanzees matched without observing their partner’s
outcomes. Moreover, the fact that humans can use more ad-
vanced understanding of the tasks does not necessarily mean that
they do so. These differences should be investigated through
replication, particularly those involving different formats (e.g., on
computerized tasks, for which all species have shown comparable
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abilities in other kinds of cognitive tests). With additional expe-
rience or procedures, we expect that more pairs of each of these
species, but in particular the nonhumans, might show coordinated
behavior. Such manipulations would better illustrate the nature of
the species differences reported here, and will clarify how co-
ordination behavior can emerge.
We ﬁnd that when conditions are held as similar as possible,
humans outperform other primates in ﬁnding maximizing solu-
tions to a noncontingent economic game, but the differences in
performance are not as great as might be anticipated. Rather,
individuals in all species may ﬁnd efﬁcient outcomes, and the dif-
ference lies in the proportion of pairs within a species that do so.
These results provide initial evidence that, as with other behaviors,
humans’ behavior in cooperative economic games may be part of
an evolutionary continuum in which our decision-making strate-
gies emerged from those of our common ancestors. Nonetheless,
humans are superior at coordination compared with other spe-
cies, a fact that may be due to other sorts of behaviors, such as
narrative language and cognitive capacities that have emerged in
the interim.
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